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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

taking, the court applied the three-factor test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City: (1)
the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investmentback expectations; (2) the character of the government action; and (3)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. The court
held that the Hages purchased the water rights with the ranch, satisfying the first factor. The behavior of the USFS, which consisted of
threats, letters, and personal visits, amounted to intimidation, souring
the USFS case for the second factor. The USFS argued the Hages could
have applied for a special use permit, but that the Hages would have
been limited to the use of hand tools. Nevertheless, the court held that
because the amount of resultant work would be so extensive, that stipulation amounted to a prohibition. Lastly, the court held that the ranch
was economically unviable without the water rights.
Thus, the court held the USFS had taken the Hages property, more
than 17,000 acre-feet. At $162.50 an acre foot, the court awarded just
compensation of $2.8 million.
Zachary Smith
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
United States v. Robertson Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 2d
210 (D. D.C. 2008) (holding (1) the United States maintains fee simple
title to the lands it holds, subject to trusts for the public benefit; (2)
the doctrine of accretion only applies to natural increases of riparian
land; and (3) riparian owners qualified right to lay fill and construct
wharves on appurtenant land is subject to governmental regulation).
The United States brought this quiet title action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia against the record-title holders to all
lands, submerged and fast, along the Potomac River waterfront in
Alexandria, Virginia. The Old Dominion Boat Club ("Old Dominion"), one of several named defendants, held record title to two disputed areas, the North and South Tracts, of the Alexandria waterfront.
In this case, Old Dominion moved for summary judgment on the basis
that it had the right to possess the fast land at issue, regardless of
whether the land existed east of the defining "1791 mark." The court
granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The land at issue along the Potomac River originally belonged to
the King of England. Before the American Revolution, the King
granted all the land of what is now the State of Maryland to Lord Baltimore, including the bed of the Potomac River. Lord Baltimore's land
and title passed to Maryland following the American Revolution, and
in 1791 Maryland ceded the land to the United States for the District
of Columbia. Thus, the United States maintained title to the bed of
the Potomac River since 1791.
Old Dominion presented four arguments against the United States'
assertion of title. First, it argued the United States only held trust title,
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rather than fee title, to the bed of the Potomac River. Second, Old
Dominion argued it held title to the fast land on the North and South
Tracts pursuant to the doctrine of accretion. Third, it argued even if it
did not have title, Old Dominion was a riparian owner and had the
fight to lay fill and construct wharves on the beds of navigable waters
appurtenant to its property. Finally, Old Dominion argued several
equitable defenses barred the United States from asserting title to the
land in question: the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel prevented the United States from bringing suit; Congress had effectively
ratified the existence of privately owned fill and wharves on the Alexandria Waterfront; and Old Dominion was a bona fide purchaser, thereby precluding any title action.
The United States principally contended Old Dominion built additions on top of land to which it held title, so the United States therefore owned them. It argued Old Dominion did not have tide to fast
land east of the 1791 mark because the United States held fee simple
title to the land. The United States also asserted Maryland law, as it
existed through the Organic Act of 1801, governs riparian rights within
the District of Columbia. As such, riparian owners must gain authorization to lay fill or construct wharves. However, if Old Dominion did
have a right to act, it was a qualified right subject to regulation by the
United States. Further, any right to lay fill and construct wharves requires riparian owners to allow public access.
Regarding title, the court determined the United States held fee
tide, not just trust title, to the bed of the Potomac River. However,
such title remained subject to a public trust for navigation and fishery,
so the United States could not use the land in any way that would interfere with the trust. Thus, the United States retained fee simple title to
the riverbed, regardless of whether Old Dominion constructed fast
land on top of it.
In addition, the court dismissed Old Dominion's misinterpretation
of Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan that the United States only held the bed of
the Potomac River in trust for future states. Although Hagan held the
United States holds lands in trust for future states, and title passes to a
new'state upon formation, the court noted the District of Columbia is a
territory in which the United States has the express power to exercise
municipal jurisdiction and sovereignty. In addition, because the District of Columbia is not merely a territory that may one day become a
state, the United States does not hold the land in trust for that purpose. Therefore, the United States, through its express municipal
powers, appropriately held fee title to the beds of navigable waters
within the boundaries of the District of Columbia.
The court next addressed Old Dominion's assertion of title
through the doctrine of accretion. In particular, it clarified "accretion"
only refers to natural increases of riparian land through the gradual
deposit of solid material, such as mud or sand. Accretion does not re-
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fer to the purposeful addition of land to waterfront property, such as
Old Dominion's fill and wharves. As such, Old Dominion could not
assert title to the land through the doctrine of accretion.
Regarding a riparian owner's right to lay fill and construct wharves,
the court agreed with the United States that Maryland law of 1801 governed Old Dominion's rights. The Supreme Court in Shivley v. Bowiby
ruled the law of the state that is sovereign over the body of navigable
water at issue determines the riparian rights; in this case, Maryland law
of 1801 governs the District of Columbia. Such law provided riparian
owners a qualified right to lay fill and construct wharves, subject to
United States' regulation.
Additionally, the court ruled that riparian owners do not, merely as
a result of this qualified right, obtain title to the land and/or water
underneath these structures. However, it determined that Old Dominion may construct and possess fill and wharves on the North and
South Tracts, so long as these structures remain within harbor lines.
Thus, the court ruled that Old Dominion was entitled to possess all
structures that it could prove were built within harbor lines. A material
question of fact existed as to whether Old Dominion may possess all of
the open pile structures on the North and South Tracts, as well as the
solid fill on the North Tract.
The court next rejected, for lack of foundation, the United States'
assertion that the law requires a riparian owner to allow public access
to wharves and fill on its land. The United States failed to overcome a
riparian owner's general right to construct wharves and fill for private
purposes.
Lastly, the court rejected all of Old Dominion's equitable defenses.
First, the laches defense never applies to the United States for its title
claims, and the United States brought this action to protect the public
right to the riverbed; therefore Old Dominion could not assert this
defense. Second, Old Dominion failed to satisfy all the elements of
equitable estoppel, namely that it relied on a statute to its detriment.
As such, nothing estopped the United States from asserting title.
Third, Congress' knowledge of private wharves on the Alexandria waterfront did not substantiate an argument that it officially approved of
and ratified them. Finally, not only had the United States never
granted title to the land at issue, as Old Dominion conceded, but Old
Dominion was not even a subsequent grantee of the United States'
originally held land. Therefore, the trial court rejected the bona fide
purchaser defense.
In conclusion, the court held Old Dominion could possess the land
because there was no dispute of material fact that all of the fast land on
the North Tract and all of the open pile piers on the South Tract were
within the appropriate harbor lines. However, there were disputes of
material fact as to the following: (1) whether all of the solid fill on the
South Tract was within harbor lines; (2) whether Old Dominion was
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entitled to possess the open pile structures on the North and South
Tracts; and (3) whether Old Dominion was entitled to possess the solid
fill on the North Tract. As such, the district court granted Old Dominion's motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part.
Brandonj Campbell
STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, No. 1 CA-CV 06-0442, 2008 WL
2895941 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 29, 2008) (holding: (1) Strawberry Water
Company had standing to sue in a utility tampering action because it,
or its predecessor, provided water services to the pipe from which Paulsen diverted water; (2) Strawberry Water Company had standing to sue
for conversion of its water because the water was personal property
while it maintained actual possession and control; and (3) comparative
fault applied to a conversion claim because the water was personal
property).
Frank Parkinson owned a water company in Strawberry, Arizona.
He installed a pipe that diverted water from his company's line to fill a
pond at his personal residence. Strawberry Water Company ("Strawberry") was the successor in interest to the water line from which Parkinson diverted water. Randall and Virginia Paulsen ("Paulsen")
owned Parkinson's house and the accompanying pond. Strawberry
sued Paulsen, alleging conversion and utility tampering for unlawfully
diverting Strawberry's water to fill the pond. The jury found for Strawberry and awarded damages. Paulsen appealed to the Arizona Court of
Appeals and claimed Strawberry lacked standing because it had not
established an ownership interest in the water. Additionally, he
claimed that comparative fault applied to the award of damages.
The court first addressed whether Strawberry had standing. Arizona uses the real party in interest test, which requires the plaintiff to
show that it has an interest in the outcome of the litigation. In an action for utility tampering, the law does not impose a requirement of
ownership. Any public utility may bring the action if it shows that "it or
its predecessors were providing water to the pipe from which the water
was diverted." Here, Paulsen acknowledged that Strawberry provided
the water in the pipe. Since Strawberry provided the water, it had an
interest in the litigation's outcome and thus had standing to sue.
To have standing in an action for conversion, however, the plaintiff
must show ownership of the chattel. Water rights represent an interest
in real property. Specifically, groundwater is a usufructuary right,
which means a right to use, not own. Since water is not personal property, water rights are not susceptible to a claim for conversion. When,
however, the holder of water rights pumps water though pipes and
reduces it to actual possession and control, the water becomes personal

